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THE VIRTUAL COUNCIL OF WAR:
RELATIONSHIPS, TRUST AND INFLUENCE BETWEEN THE
JOINT FORCES COMMANDER AND HIS AIR COMPONENT

by

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Abstract

This study addresses the problem of geographically separated commanders, the impact of separation and the affect of electronic meeting systems on their relationship. The author examines the problems to building relationships, establishing trust and gaining influence caused by geographically separated headquarters linked with tele-visual communications. The paper identifies two proposals to the Air Force deployed command structure resulting in separated but electronically connected commanders: Global JFACC and Standing Core Joint Forces Headquarters. Next, the paper examines the effects of organizations that depend upon electronic meeting systems to bind its geographically separated parts, focusing on the ability to communicate and problem solve. It then examines the historical relationships between three pairs of commanders to examine the correlation between personal relationships and effectively employed airpower. The paper concludes that airpower solutions require an air component commander (JFACC) who can influence the Joint Forces Commander (JFC) in order for those solutions to be employed. To do this, the JFC and his JFACC should build a relationship face-to-face. The JFACC must then earn the JFC's trust by effectively employing airpower towards the JFC's goals. Co-locating headquarters may be the best way to build such a relationship, but circumstances may dictate separation. In those instances, participants should be aware of pitfalls, strive to conduct as many face-to-face meetings as possible, and use electronic meeting systems with the most social presence possible.

Chapter 1

Introduction

The time has come when a contingency force can be commanded from home. It may be easier now for a Joint Forces Commander (JFC) to remain at a CONUS or other geographically remote headquarters while his component commanders remain at their own, separate operations centers. Today technology allows a commander to establish a command structure spread across thousands of miles and many time zones. For those contemplating establishing such an organization, the question should not just be “do we have the bandwidth for the teleconferences?” Instead of asking can we set up such an organization, perhaps the military should be asking, “should we?” There should be deeper concern than mere capabilities and that is the fundamental question of how does this virtual council of war affect relationships?

Warfare and military actions are human affairs, affected by intellect, emotion and personality. At the root lies the relationship between the commander and his subordinate commanders. As leaders prosecute war, they must decide questions of strategy and employment and depend upon subject experts for advice. The quality of this advice depends partly on how well those commanders get along. Do they trust each other? Do subordinates have enough influence so the commander heeds advice? This trust and

influence stem from the relationships built between the commanders that traditionally, have been built and strengthened by using the council of war.

In the earliest days of warfare, the commander would hold his council of war before the campaign and often before a battle. Around the camp table generals and staff would debate the actions to be taken. Commanders could judge much from the physical presence of his subordinates, like the readiness of their command, their morale and fitness. The wisest commanders would listen and allow themselves to be influenced by the advice of their subordinates, especially those they knew and trusted. If the plan was sound, the men resolute and the fates cooperative, victory would be at hand. Yet today, when commanders summon their marshals to the council of war, the table is often a computer screen in many rooms separated by thousands of miles. Can a commander gauge subordinates and build a relationship via a virtual council of war? This unique problem stems from the realities of modern fiscal, political and organizational constraints.

The realities of fiscal restraint and geo-politics have driven contemporary U.S. force structure to become mostly garrisoned within the continental United States (CONUS). Coupled with the growing unpredictability of future hot spots, having a permanent forward presence located at the right place is often difficult. The ramifications are that U.S. forces must set out from the CONUS to implement America's military instrument of power.

This places great strain upon the mobility infrastructure to rapidly deploy and support the armed forces. Consequently, any effort to reduce the "footprint" of deployed forces increases the combat power that may be brought to bear in a given time. One way

this is accomplished is reducing the size of the command element. If part of the staff remains at a fixed headquarters and participates via technology, then the space they free up can be devoted to combat forces. In effect, logistics may force the commander to keep some of his modern-day marshals outside the theater when executing his campaign.

Adding to the logistical constraints, organizational constructs may also separate the commander from his subordinate commanders. Functional global commanders directing worldwide assets and fixed command and control centers physically remove subordinate commanders from their table-side place at the council of war.

These constraints may force a JFC to form an organization where he separates himself from his component commanders. This will affect how they interact and form relationships and ultimately, have some impact on the command's effectiveness. This paper explores the importance of those relationships and the impact of the electronic systems used to bind the organization together from the Air Force (AF) perspective.

Scope

Desert Storm was one of the first conflicts where airpower was the dominant mode of employing combat power. Many contingencies since the Gulf War have been airpower-centric. Additionally, none of the supreme commanders during those contingencies were airmen. Consequently, these commanders depended heavily upon their air component commanders. Since this trend is unlikely to change and airpower will play a large if not dominant role in future conflicts, the relationship between the air component commander and the JFC takes on great importance. Therefore, this paper focuses on the relationships between the air component commander and the JFC.

Relevance

A review of the literature reveals little work has been accomplished on the impact of geographic separation on the relationships between a commander and his subordinate commanders. Furthermore, little work has been accomplished to determine if technology can replace face-to-face relationships in the military context. There is also little work about the affects of depending upon electronic systems and virtual organizations on military effectiveness. This paper begins to fill the void by examining how geographical separation and dependence upon technology affects the relationships of commanders and their effectiveness.

Methodology

This paper uses a qualitative research method based primarily upon literature review and analysis. The first step determined what organizational ways the Air Force might force the physical separation of the JFACC from the JFC. The second step was to research literature for the impact of geographically separated groups. The majority of such research centered on distance education and the virtual workplace. The last step was to review recent history to gain an understanding of the role of personal relationships between commanders. Since this paper is scoped to consider commanders and their air generals, the research focused on modern conflicts. Examples were drawn from WWII, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. The aim was to provide examples of both good and bad relationships to determine whether a correlation between relationships and the effectiveness of airpower employment existed. The majority of the research centered on autobiographies and histories written by the principal commanders, and examined the problems by answering a research question and two investigative questions.

Research Question:

What does the increasing reliance on communications technology mean to the JFC-JFACC relationship?

Investigative Questions:

What barriers to relationships, communication and influence exist in a virtual organization?

What does history teach about the kind of relationships that should be developed between the JFACC and the JFC?

Validity

Though this paper focuses on the JFC and the air component commander, applications can be applied to most command relationships. For instance, the findings of this paper may be applied to the relationship between the JFACC and his Director of Mobility Forces. Likewise, this research is valid for any geographically separated command structure. Next, the reader is cautioned about the primary weakness of this paper, historical causation. This paper's historical examples attempt to show how the JFACC's relationship with his JFC impacted the employment of airpower. It is impossible to say with certainty that those relationships were the sole cause for effective or ineffective airpower. Though the relationship was a major factor, many factors may have contributed to the end result.

Chapter 2

Ramifications of the Virtual Council of War

Two major aspects of modern command structures are their size and the technology that allows them to control and coordinate operations with forces hundreds, even thousands of miles away from themselves. This chapter addresses some of the ways in which the Air Force envisions a structure where the air component commander would be geographically separated from the JFC. Next, it discusses some of the problems and benefits resulting from when commanders choose to separate themselves and depend upon electronic meeting systems to stay connected.

Concepts Separating the Commanders

The military is considering several concepts that may physically separate the JFACC from his commander. Two of these concepts are the Global JFACC and the Standing Core Joint Forces Headquarters.

Global JFACC

The concept of the Global JFACC (GFACC) is one solution to the problem posed by having a limited number of long-range, globally capable assets that are not assigned to the combatant commanders. Current policy is to allocate forces to individual CINCs for the execution of their campaign plans. A problem arises when more than one

contingency occurs simultaneously since “dividing scarce assets between theater CINCs may not be the most efficient means to win a multitheater air campaign.”¹ Examples of such assets include manned conventional bombers and strategic reconnaissance aircraft. As technology advances, aerospace assets will become more capable while simultaneously growing more expensive, which may result in smaller numbers of aircraft. This would increase the need for global command and control of such assets.² To meet this demand, the GFACC would command air and space forces from a central location, employing his forces in multiple theaters while geographically separated from the supported commander.

Standing Core Joint Force Headquarters

Another concept that may doctrinally separate the JFACC from his JFC is the Standing Core Joint Force Headquarters. The idea is to leave the majority of the Joint Force Commander’s headquarters remain fixed, deploying only a small staff to the theater.³ In its advanced form, the JFC and his staff would deploy and depend upon communications technology to “reachback” to the organizations out of the theater. Interestingly, the organizations envisioned being left out of the theater include the functional component commanders.⁴ The Standing HQ anticipates using technology, especially during the opening stages of a conflict, to unite its various components and to replace face-to-face meetings,.

Can Technology Replace Face-to-face Relationships?

The need to reduce the number of personnel sent forward into a theater has forced JFCs to make tough decisions with regard to who should join him as part of his

headquarters. Leaving portions behind can be an answer, but can technology overcome problems caused by separation between the JFC and his subordinate air component commander? This section looks at how technology may or may not replace the dynamics of a close spatial relationship between commanders.

Types of Electronic Meeting Systems

Electronic meeting systems (EMS) are ways to conduct meetings via electronic medium. EMS can range from the most technologically advanced video teleconference (VTC) to the traditional telephone. How EMS affects relationships and meeting dynamics is an important point to consider. In his doctoral study, Morten Ender defined the quality interaction of EMS as the degree of social presence that the medium conveys and how salient a participant is to the interaction.⁵ Using social presence as a guide, a simple ordering of the various EMS can be developed. Highest quality EMS would be the VTC where spoken words are heard and at least some portion of the speaker can be seen by camera and viewed on a monitor. Next would be a meeting held using the telephone where only the voice could be heard with no transmittal of visual cues. Computer chat, which allows participants to communicate in real or near real-time via type written messages over a computer network would follow. Finally, e-mail would be the lowest quality of interaction where written messages are further degraded by a delay in time. Each of these types of EMS has been used as the medium for binding an organization together over distances and for conducting meetings and problem solving sessions with differing degrees of success. Their success stems directly from how well they facilitate communication.

Barriers to Communication

Transmission Quality

The first barrier to communication created by EMS is the poor quality of the transmission or reception that interferes with the subtle aspects of communication. Three types of quality problems exist: physical, technical and intentional. First, physical barriers affecting quality are those minor nuisances that are easily overcome during a face-to-face meeting but hurts the quality of communication during an electronic meeting. Background noises may drown out the voice that has to be picked up by a microphone or a person stepping in front of a fixed camera may block a presentation. Similar problems occur when someone accidentally pushes the mute button or steps off camera.⁶ Additionally, technical problems present another barrier to transmission quality. Such problems caused by faulty transmission, reception or defective equipment decreases the quality of communication and may totally preclude it.

Intentional disruption, the third barrier to quality, is of particular importance to military users of EMS. An organization dependent upon EMS to facilitate meeting and problem solving needs makes its EMS a lucrative target for the enemy. In short, the EMS becomes a center of gravity that must be protected. Such protection requires redundancy and survivability be built into the EMS. If either of these expensive efforts fail, an adversary may degrade the quality or stop all communication, thereby disrupting the organization itself. Even if the quality of the transmission is good, further barriers may exist such as a threatened sense of competence.

Threatened Sense of Competence or Authority

In listing barriers to distance learning, Muilenberg and Berge introduced the notion of a threatened sense of competence and/or authority.⁷ Being uncomfortable with technology may impact participants' feelings of competence, which in turn impacts involvement in the meeting. Moreover, those who are physically distant are often forgotten or lose credibility. After studying a conference of telecommuters, Rod Davies pointed out that it is hard for leaders to take into confidence those they do not see—the “human animal just doesn't trust other people who it hasn't met.”⁸ The correlation to military organizations based on EMS is obvious. If the only contact between a commander and his council of war is by electronic meetings, it may be hard for members to be taken as seriously as if they met face-to-face. Similarly, people “experienced greater rapport, trust and cooperation in the face-to-face condition.”⁹ Even trust and credibility within a team may be limited when it is created in the virtual environment.¹⁰ Ultimately, it seems easier to dismiss those not physically present, therefore hindering the capabilities of the group.

Lost Information

Organizations dependent upon EMS for its structure are also hindered by lost information not caused by technical malfunction. Two principle reasons for this loss are incomplete reading of nonverbal communication and information lost in a flood of information. Not being able to completely interpret all of the nuances of nonverbal communication is a significant barrier to communication, since up to 60% of communication is conveyed by nonverbal cues.¹¹ Even high-quality VTCs may only display the head and shoulders of participants where “gestures and posture are not fully

visible,” where it is hard to get eye contact, and everyone is limited to a confined space to be seen and heard.¹² Vrasidas points out that nonverbal gestures are exchanged constantly to provide feedback, and as the technology used decreases in its degree of social presence, dependence upon non-verbal forms of feedback increases.¹³ Quality communication often depends upon contextual cues delivered by feedback and the inability to fully convey such richness often degrades the communication process. Additionally, any organization depending on e-mail as a communication tool may suffer from losing information in the flood of messages received daily. Many professionals received hundreds of daily e-mails and divining the important from the mundane may be very difficult.¹⁴ Even when e-mail serves only as a supplemental form of communication, much may be lost by the inundation of messages.

Lack of Interaction

A greater barrier to communication is a lack of interaction in EMS-dependent organizations. If an organization must be “virtual” there may be problems in the amount, types and quality of interaction between participants. First, the amount of interaction tends to be low and decreases over time in computer conferencing compared to much higher amounts that increase over time in face-to-face groups.¹⁵ Though this may be a result of text-based communication, it has ramifications in all forms of electronic media. The amount and freedom of interaction in any recorded environment may be less than face-to-face meetings because it is recorded. If a participant knows every thing spoken, written or gestured is recorded, he may not be as candid as he would be otherwise. When everything said is “for the record,” not much may be said. Moreover, the large EMS audience itself may impact interaction in a military organization. In intimate settings, a

subordinate may feel free to contradict his superior. On the other hand, in a large gathering the pressures of military etiquette may force the subordinate to wait and make his input via more private means or overlook it entirely. Either way, EMS hinders the free flow of feedback between participants. Similarly, the types of interaction change in the “virtual” organization. Opportunities for side bars and peer discussion may be less and the participants may not bond or form realistic opinions of each other.¹⁶ Loss of interaction, spontaneity and bonding hampers a group’s efficiency and capabilities.

Finally, EMS effects the quality of group interaction. Awareness of technology hampers interaction since lack of technical skills forces concentration on the technology rather than the meeting. Also, as comfort with the level of technology increases, interaction increases, though it may never equal face-to-face meetings.¹⁷ Geographic separation also hinders quality interaction. When based in different time zones, working during normal duty hours may be impossible, and the quality of thinking goes down when biological clocks are disrupted.¹⁸ Additionally, some members may “grand stand,” making inputs more for the historian than for the mission. Though these “virtual” organizations may have trouble with quality interaction, they will miss out on the most pervasive and penetrating form of social interaction in an organization, informal problem solving.¹⁹

Informal Problem Solving

The barrier to communication that has the most profound affect on EMS-dominated groups is its affect on informal problem solving. Mangrum, Fairley and Wieder discovered that informal, spontaneous meetings are critical to collaborative problem solving.²⁰ They are often hidden, taken for granted and occur without anyone

actually perceiving they occur. Group members meet briefly—just minutes around a desk—not only to clarify information, but more often to improve processes.²¹ In effect, these spontaneous meetings served as the primary way for the group to communicate and improve itself. Geographic separation of a team prevents informal problem solving. Even though team members do not realize they use informal problem solving, they do. Therefore, a virtual group may feel it is functioning well, but it is actually missing its most powerful problem-solving tool and not performing as well as it could.

Benefits to Communication

Though barriers exist because of the nature of a virtual organization, EMS does improve some aspects of the group dynamic. First, those traditionally left out of meetings and the decision making process because of their geographic separation can be included on a regular basis.²² Additionally, more people can be included in the meeting than ever could before when space was limited to the capacity of the conference room. Second, EMS dependent upon written comments tends to generate communication that is more carefully constructed and extensive than verbal ones.²³ Additionally, such an EMS reduces the ability of aggressive members to monopolize the meeting, resulting in more equal participation. Finally, meetings using the written medium allow women to forcibly express themselves without the negative group impact usually experienced when women adopt male-like aggression.²⁴ So if women or others who traditionally meet resistance in getting their views across—lower ranking officers for instance—can preserve anonymity in an EMS meeting, their views may have a greater impact.

Summary

Organizations depending upon electronic meeting systems have several barriers to communication, but they may be mitigated. Interaction during electronic meetings increases with the comfort level of the participants, but the real benefit is in achieving as close to a face-to-face meeting as one can by maximizing social presence.²⁵ The more realistic the meeting, the more correctly intentions are perceived, the greater the chance of corroboration and the greater the satisfaction with the meeting. Additionally, face-to-face meetings are more efficient than any other means of conducting meetings, so care should be made to increase social presence in all EMS used.²⁶ On the other hand, it is hard to mitigate the EMS-caused loss of impromptu problem solving. This point must be emphasized since such meetings occur unnoticed and may not be missed. If the majority of problem solving occurs ad hoc, EMS organizations may be falling short of what they could be accomplishing. In the end, technology can replace face-to-face meetings and group decision-making, but commanders must be aware of the problems they present. EMS should supplement and add to the organization, not detract from it. Since barriers to communication all too easily exist in conventional meetings and groups, leaders should be wary of complicating the group dynamic by depending upon EMS.

Notes

¹ Alan W. Howey, et al., *Global Dynamic Operations*, Airpower Research Institute Paper (Maxwell AFB, AL, 2001), 2.

² Ibid., 3.

³ *Adaptive Joint Command and Control*, U.S. Joint Forces Command White Paper (Norfolk NAS, VA, 2000), 2-3.

⁴ Ibid., 2-13.

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⁵ Morten Gaston Ender, "Soldiering Toward the Information Superhighway: The Comparison of Old and New Communication Media Use During Military Operations in the Post-Cold War Era" (PhD diss., University of Maryland at College Park, 1996), 5.

⁶ Deborah S. Kezsbom, "Creating Teamwork in Virtual Teams," *Cost Engineering*, 42, no. 10 (October 2000): 33-36.

⁷ Lin Muilenburg and Zane L. Berge, "Barriers to Distance Education: A Factor-Analytic Study," *The American journal of Distance Education* 15, no.2 (2001): 9, 11.

⁸ Rod Davies, "Internet Conference on Telecommuting," *Workforce* 80, no. 4 (April 2000): 31-36.

⁹ Jill Purdy and Pete Nye, "The Impact of Communication Media on Negotiation Outcomes," *International Journal of Conflict Management* 11, no. 2 (2000): 165-168.

¹⁰ Kezsbom, 35-36.

¹¹ Ibid., 33-35.

¹² Purdy and Nye, 164.

¹³ Charalambos Vrasidas and Marina Stock McIsaac, "Factors Influencing Interaction in an Online Course," *American Journal of Distance Education* 13, no. 3 (1999): 24.

¹⁴ Samuel Greengard, "Surviving Internet Speed," *Workforce* 80, no. 4 (April 2000): 32-35.

¹⁵ Jeanette McDonald and Chere Campbell Gibson, "Interpersonal Dynamics and Group Development in Computer Conferencing," *The American Journal of Distance Education* 12, no. 1 (1998): 9. More interactions from more participants was reported by Vrasidas. Vrasidas and McIsaac, 28.

¹⁶ Kezsbom, 34.

¹⁷ Vrasidas and McIsaac, 23.

¹⁸ Kezsbom, 34.

¹⁹ Faye Gothard Mangrum, Michael S. Fairley and D. Lawrence Wieder, "Informal Problem Solving in the Technology-Mediated Work place," *Journal of Business Communication* 38, no. 3 (July 2000): 316.

²⁰ Ibid., 315.

²¹ Ibid., 326-330.

²² Glenn Baker, "On a Screen Near You," *New Zealand Management* 4, no. 9 (October 2001): 65-66.

²³ Jane Burdette, "Changing Channels: Using the Electronic Meeting System to Increase Equity in Decision Making," *Information Technology, Learning & Performance Journal*, 18, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 11.

²⁴ Ibid., 10.

²⁵ McDonald and Gibson, 9.

²⁶ Purdy and Nye, 166-169.

Chapter 3

Historical Relationships

In examining relationships between air generals and their commanders, a central theme is evident: JFCs tend to be non-airmen. Whether Army or Navy officers, they are not versed in the unique characteristics and potential contributions of airpower. In effect, the JFACC must be able to influence his boss and convince him that the airman's ideas about airpower are often the best way for airpower meet the JFC's objectives. Recently, the importance of this relationship has grown with the importance of airpower. As conflicts become more air-centric, the need for airpower to be properly employed has increased and therefore, so has the necessity for the JFACC to influence his non-airman boss. This chapter explores the personal relationships of three sets of general officers, each a JFC and a JFACC to examine how command relationships started, how trust was gained and how airmen influenced commanders.

Kenney and MacArthur, the Model Relationship

The South West Pacific (SWPAC) theater provides an example of two contrasting relationships and in the end, provides a model for JFC-JFACC relationships. Before Kenney took command, the air component commander in the SWPAC was Lieutenant General George H. Brett.¹ Brett commanded a disrupted air corps that never overcame the confusion of the opening days of World War 2. Allied air forces were ineffective and

their lack of impact upon the war compounded an already strained relationship between Brett and MacArthur. Three examples underscore the problems that existed. First, Brett was reluctant to co-locate his headquarters with General MacArthur's.² Next, Brett rarely met with MacArthur and spoke with him no more than eight times during his four months in command.³ Third and most importantly, MacArthur did not trust him, and by association, the air forces' loyalty was in question.⁴ General Brett had no influence upon his commander and without an expert to advise him, General MacArthur may have been ignorant of what airpower could do. In contrast, Brett's successor, General Kenney, would gain MacArthur's trust, influencing MacArthur to use airpower in effective and innovative ways.

General Kenney assumed command of the Allied Air Forces SWPAC and 5th Air Force in July 1942 becoming General MacArthur's air component commander. When Kenney arrived, New Guinea was the principal battleground. Allied air forces were effectively non-existent in the theater and Australia was subject to air attacks. Neither side had air superiority, the allies could not launch a strike package bigger than 16 bombers, and less than half of the aircraft available could fly.⁵ From these beginnings, Kenney forged a model relationship centered on in-person communication.

The relationship between the men started from nothing. Kenney did not know MacArthur personally prior to his assignment and did not communicate with him prior to arriving in Australia.⁶ After impressing MacArthur at their first meeting, Kenney worked steadily, building their relationship. First, he consolidated his headquarters with MacArthur's.⁷ Then, whenever he returned from the front lines he would meet officially with his commander and often spent leisure time with him.⁸

Not only did Kenney frequently meet with MacArthur, his air forces began to impact the war. The allies gained air superiority and ran an air blockade of Papua New Guinea.⁹ The allied air force also proved instrumental in resupplying Australian troops and interdicting the Japanese advance over the mountains of New Guinea.¹⁰ As the air forces delivered on their promises, Kenney's influence grew. Kenney convinced MacArthur to try innovative uses of airpower like airlifting troops from Australia to Port Moresby for its defense.

Not only was Kenney advising his commander on uses of airpower, he was influencing the direction of the campaign. The airlifted troops in Port Moresby were the first U.S. troops to arrive there. Kenney knew from his time spent in New Guinea that the time was right to send Americans to the front and he pushed for it; MacArthur agreed and the troops were sent.¹¹ Building on his success, Kenney advocated airlifting troops to attack Buna, thereby achieving operational surprise by their rapid movement; MacArthur agreed and Kenney's ideas helped to keep the allied momentum going.¹² Lastly, the full extent of Kenney's influence on MacArthur can be seen in the timing for the attack on Lae. The attack commenced when weather conditions were perfect for the air component.¹³ Air had become a dominant force and its application became the driver in operational timing.

General Kenney was able to maximize airpower's impact because he knew how to use airpower effectively and influenced his commander to allow him to employ airpower as he saw fit. Kenney built a relationship through face-to-face meetings and because of airpower's measurable impact, earned MacArthur's trust. The personal relationship between the men was one of trust to the point where MacArthur did not worry about the

air war and took Kenney's recommendations to heart. MacArthur said, "the Fifth Air Force hasn't failed me yet...they can work themselves out of any trouble they run into."¹⁴

Kenney earned his boss' trust and MacArthur gained effective application of airpower.

Momyer and Westmoreland, the Antithesis

General William Momyer took command of 7th Air Force and became General William Westmoreland's Air Component Commander in Vietnam in May 1966. Westmoreland was the subunified commander of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) and responsible for the war in South Vietnam (SVN).¹⁵ Momyer was responsible to two commanders in the theater: Westmoreland for the air war in SVN and to CINCPAC for air operations north of the 18th Parallel—outside SVN.¹⁶ Westmoreland and Momyer did not know each other prior to serving together, but they met often, building their relationship from scratch.

Except for SVN it was difficult determining who the theater commander in Indochina was. In the South, Momyer ran the air war for Westmoreland, coordinated Strategic Air Command (SAC) B-52 sorties and integrated naval aviation from CTF-77. For strikes in North Vietnam (NVN) PACFLT controlled naval strikes, MACV controlled strikes next to the border of SVN, PACAF controlled AF strikes, and SAC maintained operational control of its B-52s. Designating targets in NVN followed a similar scheme. 7AF or CTF-77 nominated targets—the AF and Navy HQs for airpower—that went up separate chains of command to CINCPAC. From CINCPAC, the target list would go to the JCS, then the Secretary of Defense. After coordinating with the Secretary of State, the list would go to the President for final approval. The approved list would come back

down the chain to 7AF or CTF-77 for execution.¹⁷ These complicated command relationships made the President the de facto theater commander, especially for offensive air strikes in the North. Therefore, two major command relationships existed: the one inside MACV and the one outside of MACV.

Inside MACV, Momyer and Westmoreland had a definable relationship. Their headquarters were located close, in or near Tan Son Nhut where they held weekly scheduled and impromptu meetings to discuss priorities and apportionment.¹⁸ Consequently, Momyer impressed Westmoreland who considered him dependable and strong in his convictions.¹⁹

On the other hand, outside MACV, no definable relationship existed. Though President Johnson visited two months after Momyer assumed command in 1966, that seems to be the only time the “theater commander” met with his air boss.²⁰ Additionally, it is doubtful if the President or anyone else besides General Westmoreland had any meaningful relationship with Momyer.

Westmoreland trusted his senior airman and showed this by putting more and more airpower under Momyer, while no such trust existed outside of SVN. During the siege of Con Thien, Momyer commanded all heavy fire support: B-52, tactical air and naval gunfire.²¹ Within a year, Momyer became the manager of all airpower in SVN, even commanding Marine air during the Tet Offensive.²² Outside SVN, very little trust was evident. Targeting was approved only at the highest levels with little regard to lower echelons of command. Without trust, it is hard to influence.

The degree of influence Momyer had reflects the trust evident between him and his two theater commanders. In the South, Momyer taught his commander well.

Westmoreland was astute in airpower employment and realized the only offensive element of the overall strategy in Vietnam was the NVN air campaign and there needed to be a single commander over the air assets in the theater. Furthermore, Westmoreland applied his knowledge by giving Momyer freedom to command air in the South, incorporating AF, Navy and SAC aircraft. Though Momyer did have an impact upon Westmoreland, it was not near the impact of the Kenney model and it appears he had no influence on the conduct of operations beyond the focus of the air forces.

While Momyer had some impact upon the air war in SVN, he held little influence over the war inside North Vietnam, despite being the official coordinator of the air effort.²³ For example, President Johnson boasted, “they can’t even bomb an outhouse without my approval.”²⁴ Obviously, Momyer could not influence target selection; few could. Additionally, Momyer could not influence strategy. Even though the NVN air campaign was analyzed as using airpower inefficiently and having little impact on Hanoi, the President was not influenced to change tact.²⁵ Furthermore, Momyer’s lack of influence can be seen in the ignorance displayed by the President’s team. When the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs denounced strikes against SAM sites, he thought that by not bombing them the U.S. could signal the North Vietnamese to not use them. By easing up on the opponent, like periodically stopping bombing, the enemy can be enticed to quit fighting.²⁶ Such naiveté revealed the complete lack of influence Momyer held over the President and his team.

Examining the relationships between Momyer and his various “bosses” reveals their true impact. You must have a relationship in order to build trust, and trust is a prerequisite to holding influence. Airpower is decisive when used properly, so when the

theater commander does not know how to employ airpower, airpower's effectiveness decreases if his airmen cannot properly influence him.

Horner and Schwarzkopf, Paradise Lost

The relationship between General Schwarzkopf, the CINC of U.S. Central Command and his designated JFACC, 9th AF Commander, Lieutenant General Horner presents a middle ground between the Kenney and Momyer examples. Their relationship began with little trust. General Schwarzkopf was an Army general that disliked and distrusted AF officers because of a perceived lack of results.²⁷ The CINC saw airmen as flyboys who promised more than they could deliver.²⁸ From these humble beginnings, Horner developed a relationship allowing him to employ airpower despite his commander's misgivings.

Horner realized that to influence Schwarzkopf he would first have to gain his boss' trust and confidence, so he worked on the relationship from the beginning.²⁹ Soon after Schwarzkopf took command, the first opportunity for Horner came during the CENTCOM exercise, Internal Look. Horner helped the CINC see that airpower could hurt the enemy in ways not associated with ground combat. He proved he could be trusted to fight and that airpower could give the CINC offensive options, even during a defensive stage.³⁰ More importantly, Horner showed that the AF would be a team player and work to meet the CINC's objectives.

After Iraq invaded Kuwait, Horner continued building the relationship by locating his headquarters blocks from the CINC's and meeting with him daily.³¹ During these meetings, the two generals often informally solved problems. Horner describes small matters being taken care of with a whisper, and on at least one occasion, being taken care

of privately.³² This was frustrating to the attendant staff, but Horner realized that the CINC had to express himself off the record. To publicly express an opinion could be a commitment to a course of action that would take much work to overcome.³³ For example, whispers kept the start of the ground war on time. During a briefing, Horner put his arm around the CINC and convinced him to trust the AF prediction for sufficient weather for air support. Schwarzkopf trusted him and the start was kept on schedule.³⁴ This trust was just the beginning of the results of their relationship.

The relationship built on trust allowed for innovative and effective uses of airpower. Not only was the JFACC concept first used in the conflict with Iraq, the JFACC received TACON of Patriot missile batteries for theater ballistic missile defense, control of Marine air assets and permission to conduct “Push CAS.”³⁵ Beyond innovation, Schwarzkopf trusted Horner to apply airpower strategically as well as tactically in support of the ground forces. For example, Schwarzkopf viewed the Republican Guard as an Iraqi center of gravity and wanted them targeted at the beginning of the air war. Prior to commencement of attack, the CINC became enraged that Iraqi Republican Guard units were not planned to be attacked by B-52s from the beginning and threatened to fire his AF generals if they did not change the plan. Horner was able to calm Schwarzkopf and though agreement was never reached, B-52s struck 18 hours later when the environment was safer and strategic attacks received priority.³⁶

Horner exploited the good relationship he had with Schwarzkopf to effectively employ airpower. Horner co-located his headquarters with his boss, met with him daily, and had the opportunity to impromptu problem solve. He realized he had to challenge the

CINC's ideas on airpower without forcing an overreaction, ultimately "selling him on...airpower."³⁷ But all was not paradise.

On one hand, Schwarzkopf's experience was as a ground commander, leery of AF officers from what he considered the "Curtis LeMay school of planning" where its acolytes believed that strategic bombing could do it all and that armies were obsolete.³⁸ On the other hand, he never totally trusted his airmen as shown by the Republican Guard incident. Furthermore, he did not feel comfortable with decisive airpower as shown by the timing for beginning the ground war. The start depended more upon logistics than a completed air mission. When the ground forces were ready to fight, they would fight, regardless of the status of the air campaign.³⁹ Schwarzkopf never became a believer in decisive airpower and felt more comfortable with decisiveness resting upon the shoulders of the Army.

Even though the relationship between the CINC and Horner was not paradise, Schwarzkopf allowed a far-ranging use of airpower. Schwarzkopf's aversion to sacrificing his troops' lives coupled with airpower being the first force able to strike the enemy pushed him to sanction the air campaign. Though his motives were not influenced by a complete buy in to airpower theory, the CINC did allow the campaign to be strategic and to attack Iraqi centers of gravity, not only the Republican Guard. Schwarzkopf may never have become comfortable with all of airpower's promises, but he trusted *his* airman to be a team player and work to fulfill his goals. Their relationship was a compromise, but it did allow for the effective and efficient use of airpower.

Summary

The lessons from history show the relationship between Generals Kenney and MacArthur provides the model to be emulated. Kenney established a relationship gaining MacArthur's trust and confidence that led to airpower being employed in effective and efficient ways. Moreover, Kenney's influence impacted the theater beyond his focus of airpower. In contrast, Mommyer's experiences in Vietnam showed the worst that can happen when the senior airman does not influence the commander. If no relationship exists and the airman is not trusted, then employment decisions will likely made without the airman's advice. Finally, the Persian Gulf war shows even a compromise between the two extremes allows for effective uses of airpower. Even though Schwarzkopf never became comfortable with airpower and was leery of officers from the "LeMay school of planning," he trusted his air component commander to be a team player—to always meet his goals, not an AF agenda. Trust enabled Horner to influence a leery *ground* man to let the *air* man to do his job as only an airman could.

Notes

¹ General George C. Kenney, *General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War* (1949; reprint, Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), 9-10. General Brett served as the Deputy Commander of the disbanded American-British-Dutch-Australian Command and was the senior airman in Australia when General MacArthur evacuated from the Philippines. The air commander in the Philippines, General Brereton remained in there under General Wainright.

² Ibid., 28.

³ Ibid., 50. The eighth and final meeting was to learn that he had been replaced.

⁴ Ibid., 29. General MacArthur viewed the Air Force based upon its impact. Since it had not contributed significantly to that point, the leadership was assumed to be flawed from Colonel up and therefore the promises of airpower advocates nothing but empty boasts.

⁵ Ibid., 52, 61-62. U.S. strength was only 75 fighters, 37 medium bombers, 43 heavy bombers and 18 transports combat capable. The balance was comprised of Australian aircraft.

Notes

⁶ Ibid., 29.

⁷ Ibid., 78.

⁸ Ibid., 151-152, 170. Kenney and MacArthur dined together at Thanksgiving and Christmas and discussed politics.

⁹ Ibid., 270, 274.

¹⁰ Ibid., 89, 128.

¹¹ Ibid., 94-95.

¹² Ibid., 91, 109, 116.

¹³ Ibid., 274. The attack would commence when weather grounded Japanese aircraft from Rabaul while it allowed allied aircraft to fly.

¹⁴ Ibid., 145.

¹⁵ General William W. Momyer, Address, Marine Command and Staff College, Quantico VA, 20 October 1972.

¹⁶ General William W. Momyer, Address, USAF Historical Division, Air University, 14 September 1971.

¹⁷ Lieutenant Colonel John J. Lane, Jr., *Command and Control and Communications Structures in Southeast Asia*, (Maxwell AFB AL, Air University Press, 1981), 67. Information flowed from 7AF to MACV or PACAF, and concurrently from CTF-77 to 7th Fleet to PACFLT.

¹⁸ General William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1976), 248, 277. And, Momyer, CGSC Address, 11-12. MACV HQ was near Tan Son Nhut, 7AF HQ was located at the air base. Here, Gen Momyer briefly describes his weekly meetings.

¹⁹ Ibid., 203.

²⁰ General William W. Momyer, *Air Power in Three Wars (WWII, Korea, Vietnam)*, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), 24-29. Also, Westmoreland, 213-214, 191-192, 159-160, 236.

²¹ Westmoreland, 204.

²² Lane, 53.

²³ Ibid., 65.

²⁴ Westmoreland, 119.

²⁵ Ibid., 118-122.

²⁶ Ibid., 121.

²⁷ Tom Clancy with General Chuck Horner, *Every Man a Tiger*, (New York: Berkley Books, 2000), 12.

²⁸ Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *The General's War*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company), 47.

²⁹ Clancy with Horner, 329. An example of how lack of trust results in losing the ability to influence, the CENTCOM DCINC, General Waller lost the CINC's confidence by making a mistake during an interview. This lack of trust equated to lost influence with the CINC.

³⁰ Ibid., 237-238, 248.

³¹ Ibid., 194, 199.

³² Ibid., 462. Gordon and Trainor, 200.

Notes

³³ Ibid., 462.

³⁴ Ibid., 485.

³⁵ Ibid., 243-248. Push CAS allowed the JFACC to flow CAS sorties continuously over the ground battlefield. If needed, they were assigned CAS targets. If not needed, the sorties struck deeper targets. The result was a flexible CAS that did not dedicate sorties to the ground commanders.

³⁶ Gordon and Trainor, 200-201.

³⁷ Clancy with Horner, 461.

³⁸ General H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, *It Doesn't Take a Hero*, (New York: Linda Grey Bantam Books, 1992), 318. Schwarzkopf trusted airmen that knew as much about CAS as about strategic attack.

³⁹ Gordon and Trainor, 307.

Chapter 4

Conclusions

Recommendations for Building a Relationship

The relationship between the JFC and his JFACC is important to the effective and efficient use of airpower. Past acquaintance does not seem to impact the relationships. What does matter is increasing the influence of the JFACC. The path to that increase is based on the JFACC building a relationship founded on trust so his advice will be heeded.

The formula for getting there is simple. First, the JFC must know his JFACC personally, and they must take every opportunity to meet; co-located headquarters are the best way to do this during a contingency. It is hard to trust someone you do not know or see, so be known and seen. Co-location also allows for impromptu problem solving and decreases many of the communication barriers caused by EMS. Second, the JFACC may earn trust in two other ways. One, demonstrate that the JFACC's goals fulfill the JFC's objectives, not an AF agenda. Two, airpower must get results. Fulfilled promises about strategic attack and battlefield preparation go a long way to showing airpower meets the JFC's goals.

Ramifications of a Virtual Council of War

This formula for building relationships is complicated when commanders depend upon EMS to build it. As a JFC gathers his virtual council of war to decide the direction of a campaign, what problems might he expect to encounter? Beyond the obvious problems of quality—misunderstanding a speech or not seeing a slide—deeper dilemmas may manifest themselves.

Problems with Interaction, Trust and Problem Solving

If members of an EMS organization are not comfortable with the technology, they may not participate as much as they otherwise would. Additionally, if everything is recorded, they may be reluctant to be candid or to contradict the JFC. On the other hand, some may grandstand, choosing responses more for the historian than for the mission.

Next, when a JFC does not meet face-to-face with his JFACC, he may lose rapport and confidence in him. Human nature makes it tough to trust someone who is distant. The air commander may become more a “talking head” on the screen than a JFACC. Furthermore, the relationships examined showed that to have significant influence, one must first establish a relationship then build trust. Distant relationships are troublesome since they hinder the element of trust. Nothing replaces a handshake or a whisper.

Finally, the most troublesome problem is how a virtual military organization informally problem solves. Informal problem solving will take place; the question is how EMS impacts that process. VTCs leave little time for sidebars and spontaneity, so as the JFC or more importantly, members of his staff contemplate a problem, they may turn to individuals in the next cubicle instead of calling the experts at another headquarters. This would lead to people taking on roles they were not hired to fill. This happened to

General Kenney's predecessor, General Brett. Since MacArthur's staff shunned him, the staff took it upon itself to formulate policy on employing airpower.¹ Therefore, the opportunity for commanders and staffs to interact should be protected.

Recommendations for a Separated JFACC

Since the JFACC may not be able to co-locate his headquarters with the JFC, several steps can be taken to overcome some of the negative ramifications of virtual organizations. To begin with, every opportunity must be made to get the organization together prior to the contingency via EMS so the staff can become at ease with the technology. Next, use VTCs as much as possible, with other systems like computer chat, phone calls, and e-mail to supplement. Also, EMS should be high quality, redundant and survivable. Fourth, opportunities for impromptu problem solving must be made available to all members of the staff. A possible way to do this is to use instant messaging. Existing software enables users to tell when someone from a group is on their computer and to simultaneously chat with multiple users. Finally, since trust decreases when participants are unknown to each other, personal relationships must be established. The JFACC should take every opportunity to be a presence beside his JFC.

Bottom Line

Airpower provides solutions to problems on the commander's table and unless the JFACC holds the commander's trust and is able to influence his JFC to contemplate those answers, airpower loses effectiveness.

Recommendations for Further Research

Further research should study how commanders in hierarchical and sometimes authoritarian military organizations interact using EMS. Additional research should focus on Operation ENDURING FREEDOM where each component commander operated from his fixed headquarters, geographically separated from the JFC. Research should also look at ways EMS can facilitate impromptu problem solving. How do such things as instant messaging compare to ad hoc, face-to-face meetings? Finally, research should be conducted examining ways the AF can build officers to become Joint Force Commanders sought out by the rest of the military establishment and the Secretary of Defense and the President.

Notes

¹ General George C. Kenney, *General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949), 9-10.

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